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Bora Laskin and the Legal Process
School
Paul Horwitz*
[T]o say that judges make law is not the end but only the
beginning of sophistication.
-Paul A. Freund1




Over his five decades in the law-as a student at Osgoode Hall and Harvard
Law School, as a teacher and labour arbitrator, and as a justice on the bench
of the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada-Bora
Laskin left behind an extensive paper trail with which one may attempt to
describe and evaluate his jurisprudential beliefs. In particular, since the
bench demands judgment on particular facts and largely assumes the validity
of precedential reasoning, the unfettered academic and extrajudicial writings
left behind by Laskin allow for a clear examination of his legal philosophy.
3
Why then, with this wealth of material, does confusion yet remain about
Laskin's place in legal thought?
Evaluations of Laskin's extrajudicial writing have placed him somewhere
among the Legal Realist movement, a loosely based school of thought that
M.S. (Columbia), LL.B. (Toronto). Currently a student-at-law with Borden & Elliot, Toronto.
This paper was prepared for the "Canadian Constitutional Tradition" course, taught by Prof.
R.C.B. Risk at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Professor Risk for
suggesting this line of inquiry. This paper received the Osgoode Society Legal History Book
Prize, awarded by the Faculty of Law. I wish to thank the Osgoode Society for its generous
support of scholarship in the field of legal history.
1 P.A. Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) at 3.
2 N. Duxbury, "Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence" (1993) 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 601 at 679.
For a list of Laskin s extrajudicial writings, see the bibliography compiled in S. Kelford, "The
Writings of the Rt. Hon. Bora Laskin, O.C., P.C." (1984) 6 Supreme Court L. Rev. xliii.
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developed in the first three decades of the twentieth century and that
attacked the dominant "Classical" school of legal thought as "philosophically
naive and politically pernicious."4 Thus, Denise Reaume's examination of
Laskin's legal thinking places him in league with "the school of sociological
jurisprudence",5 an early branch of the realist school. Similarly, W. Laird
Hunter writes: "When Laskin's picture of the legal world is placed in the
gallery of legal thinkers, a strong resemblance is found to the attributes of the
American Realist movement."
6
However, this categorization of Laskin's judicial philosophy has been
recognized as demonstrably flawed. Thus, Brian Langille and David Beatty,
while noting that Hunter's characterization is "not entirely inaccurate",
7
note a number of aspects of Laskin's legal thought-most prominently, a
rejection of a pure preference-based understanding of judicial decision making
and an abiding faith in the judge's ability to draw legitimate decisions from
a well of community consensus-that "are in sharp contrast to many of those
[ideas] underlying what is commonly understood to be the Realist School."
8
Reaume also notes that Laskin differed from the school of sociological
jurisprudence to the extent of his concern with "the conflict between
activism and deference." 9 In short, efforts to place Laskin squarely within the
Legal Realist school consistently fall short of the mark.
In this essay I wish to propose a new categorization of Bora Laskin's legal
philosophy as delineated in his extrajudicial writings-one that reflects his
adoption of certain tenets of Legal Realism while providing a consistent
explanation for the ways in which his beliefs, his choice of subject matter
and his manner of exploring legal issues diverge from the norm of Realist
jurisprudence. I will suggest that Laskin can be better understood as a member
of the Legal Process school. This school reached its zenith in the 1950s and
1960s, in the writings of such scholars as Alexander Bickel, 10 Ernest J.
W.F. Fischer II, M.J. Horwitz & T.A. Reed, eds., American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993). Though it is narrowly based, the best history of the subject remains
L. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1986).
D. Reaume, "The Judicial Philosophy of Bora Laskin" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 438 at 439.
W.L. Hunter, "Bora Laskin and Labour Law: The Formative Years" (1984) 6 Supreme Court L.
Rev. 431 at 438.
D. Beatty and B. Langille, "Bora Laskin and Labour Law: From Vision to Legacy" (1985) 35
U.T.L.J. 672 at 679.
Ibid. at 679-80.
9 Supra note 5 at 447.
10 See e.g., A. Bickel & H. Wellington, "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case" (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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Brown, 1 Herbert Wechsler 12 and Henry M. Hart, Jr. 13 The school's principles
were described and applied in an ambitious book of cases and materials compiled
by Hart and his Harvard Law School colleague, Albert M. Sacks, entitled The
Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law.14 Though
the book was never actually published, it was nevertheless widely taught in
American schools and influenced teaching in Canadian law schools.
1 5
The Process school's influence was extraordinary: Morton Horwitz
describes it as achieving "virtual hegemony" in "postwar legal academic
thought", 16 while The Legal Process has been called "the most influential
book not produced in movable type since Gutenberg." 17 Nevertheless, as the
Process school was supplanted by other theoretical strategies-such as law
and economics, feminist theory, or Critical Legal Studies-it vanished from
both sight and mind in the legal academy. Recent efforts to re-examine the
school have been only partly successful; such treatments are often hampered
by the authors' inability to escape their own views of the law.
18
Despite the disrepair and disregard into which the Legal Process school
has fallen, this essay will show that a proper understanding of the school
reveals that its concerns and principles match the same concerns and principles
that animate Laskin's academic writing. Though Laskin differs in some small
respects from classical Legal Process theory, his writings nonetheless manifest
the same desire to reconcile Realist insights into both the indeterminacy of
law and the impossibility of a historicist, conceptualist understanding of the
law with an enduring faith in the value and possibility of the law as an ongoing,
principled enterprise. In particular, the Process school's attitudes toward
statutory interpretation are closely matched by Laskin's own attitudes.
Moreover, the legal areas in which Laskin wrote-most prominently, labour
See e.g., E.J. Brown, "The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword: Process of Law" (1958) 72
Harv. L. Rev. 77.
12 See e.g., H. Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1.
13 See e.g., H.M. Hart, Jr., "The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices" (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84.
14 H.M. Hart, Jr. & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law, tentative ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: 1958) [unpublished] [hereinafter The Legal Process].
15 Recently, Foundation Press agreed to publish an edition of the book. See W.N. Eskridge, Jr. &
P.P. Frickey, "The Making of The Legal Process" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031.
Mj. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 269.
17 J.D. Hyman, "Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law" (1976)
28 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 at 1286, note 70.
18 For example, Gary Peller complains: "[M]ost of us trained in the law since the 1960's find it
difficult to conceive of the basis for the purportedly "principled" concern about Brown [v.
Board of Education] voiced by Wechsler and other fifties legal scholars." G. Peller, "Neutral
Principles in the 1950's" (1988) 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 561 at 562.
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and constitutional law-are the primary beneficiaries of a Process understanding
of legal theory.1 9 To properly understand the Legal Process school is to gain
new insights into the internal logic of Laskin's jurisprudence. In turn, using
Laskin as a springboard to discussion of the Process school will remind us of
that school's merits.
Part II will offer a brief overview of the evolution of legal theory from
conceptualism to Legal Realism to Legal Process and will demonstrate that
modern stories about the development of legal theory fail to see the deep
roots of the Process school. Part III will offer an examination of the Legal
Process school itself. Part IV will apply this understanding to Laskin's writing,
demonstrating his neat fit within the Process school. Finally, in Part V I will
attempt to tentatively explain why Laskin's judicial philosophy adopted the
Legal Process understanding of law rather than sharing the Legal Realist
school's approach, which was dominant in his formative years of legal education
and is generally considered to take a more radical theoretical position than
that of the Process school.
II. LEGAL THEORY: FROM CONCEPTUALISM TO LEGAL PROCESS
One reason the affinity of Laskin with Legal Process may have escaped the
attention of other commentators is that, with some variations but few exceptions,
a common story about the development of legal theory in the United States
has taken hold among legal academics. The story is one of Legal Realism
triumphing over nineteenth century conceptualism, then being co-opted by
the Legal Process school. In this story, Legal Process flares into prominence in
the 1950s and 1960s but quickly withers away in the face of the social turmoil
of the 1960s, which demonstrates the impossibility of the Legal Process project.
Thus, as the story runs, "American legal thought faced a crisis in the
1940's." 20 Lawyers of the period faced "a rupture between old-line liberty-of-
contract traditionalists and the legal realists." 21 Furthermore, Realism was
rendered untenable as a valid and socially appropriate theoretical strategy in
light of the rise of fascism and anti-communism, which made a positivistic
approach unacceptable. 22 Legal Process theory was born in an attempt to salvage
law from the Realist revolution.
19 See R.B. Stevens, Law School (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983) at 271:
"The institutional aspect of the process school was especially important to constitutional law,
labour law, and criminal law."
20 W.N. Eskridge, Jr., "Metaprocedure" (1989) 98 Yale L.J. 945 at 962.
2122 Peller, supra note 18 at 567.
See G.E. White, "The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change" in G.E. White, ed., Patterns of American Legal Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1978) 136 at 142; and W.N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994) at 141.
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Versions of the story vary as to the merits of this attempt. James Boyle
refers to Legal Process theory as one branch of "a compulsive attempt to
sublimate, deny, trivialize, or reinterpret the conclusions about the 'subjectivity'
of legal decision making that the realists had reached." 23 More heroic is Jan
Vetter's characterization: the Process school "redeemed the ideal of the rule
of law". 24 Finally, runs the story, following the brief flowering of Legal
Process during the 1950s and 1960s, "its intellectual vitality was sapped.. .as
the disorders of the late 1960's and early 1970's showed that one could not
presume that fundamental social agreement existed.,
25
If this story is correct, and Legal Process was simply a short-lived school
with its roots in the post-War environment, then the concept of Laskin as
Legal Process scholar becomes less plausible, as Laskin's own writings began
in the 1930s and carried the same ideas throughout the course of his academic
and judicial career. In fact, however, this story about Legal Process theory
may be flawed. In his recent writing on the development of the Legal Process
school, Neil Duxbury has advanced a compelling argument: "[P]rocess
jurisprudence began to flourish once the mood of realism began to wane, but
that did not mark the birth of the process perspective. Historically, the
process-oriented approach to the study of law parallels, if not precedes, legal
realism itself."26 A brief outline of the development of legal theory from the
late nineteenth century suggests that Duxbury's thesis has considerable
merit.
The starting point-the doctrine dominant in late nineteenth century
jurisprudence known generally as conceptualism or formalism-offers a fairly
uncontroversial view. Three aspects of the jurisprudence of this period are of
particular note. First, it offered a highly categorical view of the law. Rather
than appreciating the highly contextual nature of legal disputes and the malleable
quality of legal concepts, conceptualist thinking "was overwhelmingly
dominated by categorical thinking-by clear, distinct, bright-line classifications
of legal phenomena. " 27 Thus, legal thought forced the subject of analysis to
lie on the Procrustean bed of pre-existing legal concepts. As we will see, this
notion recurs in Laskin's writing. Second, conceptualists believed that accurate
23 J. Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought" (1985) 133
U. Pa. L. Rev. 685 at 702.
24 J. Vetter, "Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision Making" (1983) 33 J. Legal Educ. 412
at 416.25 M.V. Tushnet, "Metaprocedure?" (1989) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 161 at 178. The idea of fundamental
social agreement was a key tenet of the Process School; see Part III, below.
26 Supra note 2 at 602.
27 Horwitz, supra note 16 at 17.
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and enduring legal principles could be derived from a careful reading of the
law reports-not as a reflection of judicial attitudes, but by drawing from
them Platonic legal principles; this was, in Calvin Woodard's words, law as
"inductive science." 28 Third, because the law reports were considered the
repository of enduring legal principles, courts became wedded to the common
law and to the principle of stare decisis.
29
Legal Realism developed as a critique of the dominant conceptualist
mode of legal reasoning. As the Legal Realism school is outlined in ample
detail elsewhere, I will simply note some central conclusions reached by the
Realists. 30 First, Realism rejected conceptualism and slavish historicism in
favour of a functionalist treatment of the law, preferring to base "legal science"
on "the purposes and actual effects of legal rules and doctrines as well as [on]
their formulation." 31 Second, Realists "challenge[d] the orthodox claim that
legal thought was separate and autonomous from moral and political
discourse", 3 2 pointing out that judicial decision making may be guided in
small or large part by personal preferences and thus reflect the politics of the
judge. 33 Finally, largely as a result of insights such as those detailed above, it
may be said that the initial effect of Realism was to create a sense that the edifice
of law had been damaged, if not blown apart. Though the law continued to
operate, the prospect of finding any basis for an understanding of law as law,
and not simply as another branch of politics or social science, seemed suddenly
hopeless.
As significant as these developments plainly were, the extent to which
Realism represents a genuine revolution, as opposed to simply being a natural
part of the development of legal theory, is controversial. Morton Horwitz sees
Realism as part of the revolution of "Progressive Legal Thought" which arose
in reaction to the Lochner era of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the United
States. 34 Duxbury, however, deems Realism "a rather half-hearted and largely
unsuccessful attack on formalism."
35
28 C. Woodard, "The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective" (1968) 54 Va. L. Rev. 689
at 701.
29 See H.E. Yntema, "The American Law Institute" (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 319 at 321.
30 For a longer treatment of the Realist school, see e.g., Fischer, Horwitz & Reed, supra note 4;
31 Kalman, supra note 4; and Horwitz, supra 
note 16.
H.E. Yntema, "Trends of Legal Reform in the United States" (1941-42) 4 U.T.LJ. 76 at 84. See
also Horwitz, supra note 16 at 200.
3 Horwitz, ibid. at 193.
See generally J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano's, 1949). Kalman puts
the point bluntly, suggesting that Realism's enduring message is that "all law is politics."
Kalman, supra note 4 at 231.
Supra note 16 at 3-4.
Supra note 2 at 602.
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Whether or not he proves this point, Duxbury successfully makes another
argument, one of great import to an attempt to place Laskin in the Legal
Process school: many of those who are seen as leaders of the Realist movement,
along with others of the same period, are actually forerunners of the Legal
Process school in many respects. 3 6 Thus, Roscoe Pound-who coined the
term "sociological jurisprudence" and who, as a major figure at the Harvard
Law School, exerted an influence on Canadian legal scholars who studied
there 37-advanced the idea that principles based on morality and reason
help decide hard cases.38 Max Radin, generally classed with the Realist
school,39 advanced the idea that the case method could be a "pathway to
legal integrity."40 Finally, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who Morton Horwitz
takes great pains to place in the Realist pantheon, 41 noted that a judge, when
making decisions that fall in the interstices between settled legal rules,
is not to innovate at pleasure .... He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles .... He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinated to the 'primordial necessity of order
in the social life.'
4 2
In addition, Duxbury points out that Process jurisprudence was not merely a
creation of the late 1950s. Instead, this jurisprudence developed from earlier
criticism of Realism by such writers as Lon L. Fuller,43 of whose writings
Laskin approved.44
In short, it seems clear that the Legal Process school does not represent a
pure reactionary force that sprang up after Realism had established itself.
Instead, the Legal Process may be seen as an "evolving body of thought"
45
-
a set of principles that had begun to find form even as Realism itself developed.
36 Ibid. at 607-31.
See C.I. Kyer & J.E. Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A. Wright, the Benchers, and Legal
Education in Ontario, 1923-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) at 80-97. Pound's
ideas found circulation in Canadian legal literature; see R. Pound, "Sociology of Law and
Sociological Jurisprudence" (1943) 5 U.T.L.J. 1.
38 Duxbury, supra note 2 at 613.
See Kalman, supra note 4 at 3-4.
40 Duxbury, supra note 2 at 608.
4142 Supra note 16 at 189-92.
B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) at
141; see also Duxbury, supra note 2 at 614-18.43
Duxbury, ibid. at 622-32.
See Laskin's review of Fuller's The Law in Quest ofItself, at (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 660.
Duxbury, supra note 2 at 603.
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This is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that no temporal problems
bar the placement of Laskin within the Legal Process school: its development
is entirely contemporaneous with Laskin's own academic work. Second, by
tracing the forebears of the Legal Process school, we see among them figures
Laskin was certainly aware of and who were, in fact, great influences on his
work. Cardozo, in particular, makes regular appearances throughout the
course of Laskin's writings. 46 It is perhaps significant that Laskin, in a memoir
of his relationship with Cecil A. Wright, placed these forebears of Process
jurisprudence in a different category than the Realist school.47 Thus, we may
move to an examination of the Legal Process school with the understanding
that its key ideas represented developments in legal theory with long roots in
the law, developments of which Laskin was fully aware.
III. THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL
"Like three streams flowing together into a mighty river," writes William
Eskridge, "three twentieth-century intellectual developments came together
to produce the legal process school."4 8 These influences were a rationalism
that viewed legal reasoning as a "search for the expression of coherent reason
in the fabric of law", the development during the New Deal of the modern
administrative state and the faith in democracy generated by the rise of
totalitarianism. 49 All these influences are felt in the Legal Process school. As
we have seen, two major conflicting influences were felt in the development
of Legal Process theory: the rejection of transcendentalism occasioned by
Realism, and the need to avoid the dangers of positivism. This is the genius
of the Legal Process: "Hart and Sacks' legal process theory was a synthesis that
satisfied these antipodal jurisprudential desires by creating a proceduralist
framework whereby positivist commands would in the ordinary course be
assuredly just and reasonable."
5 °
As distinct from some varieties of Legal Realism, the motivation for a just
and reasonable legal order was more than mere functionalism for the Legal
46 See e.g., B. Laskin, "Picketing: A Comparison of Certain Canadian and American Doctrines"
(1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 10 at 11, note 5 [hereinafter "Picketing"]; B. Laskin, "The Institutional
Character of the Judge" (1972) 7 Israel L. Rev. 329 at 330, where Laskin states that Cardozo's
lectures are "as fresh for today as they were in 1921" [hereinafter "Institutional Character"];
and B. Laskin, "The Common Law is Alive and Well-And, Well?" (1975) 9 L. Soc. Gaz. 92 at
96 [hereinafter "Common Law"].
See B. Laskin, "Cecil A. Wright: A Personal Memoir" (1983) 33 U.T.L.J. 148 at 150: "It was
[Canadian legal academic W.P.M.] Kennedy who introduced us to the riches of American legal
scholarship, to Holmes and Brandeis and Cardozo, to Pound and Frankfurter, to the American
realists, to Morris Cohen and Jerome Frank, and to so many others."
48 Eskridge, supra note 22 at 141.
Ibid.
50 Eskridge, supra note 20 at 963.
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Process scholars. Rather, it stemmed from a deeply rooted faith in the law, a
belief that it was not merely an instrumentally useful form of politics but a
separate and special sphere of human activity. Norman Dorsen, who taught
a version of the Legal Process course, writes: "The towering achievement of
The Legal Process was its rigorous insistence that law is something more than
politics, that principle is-or should be-an ingredient in decision making,
and that it is not naive to hold these views." 51 This faith in law did not, however,
simply signal a return to the conceptualist faith that Platonic ideals of law
existed and could be determined by judges. Rather, it took as its project "a
radical reconception of the situation of the judge", an effort to establish principles
which would restore legitimacy to judicial decision making.
5 2
The key to this reconception of judicial legitimacy was a focus on
whether, in a given dispute, the proper process had been applied. Where a
decision was the result of the proper process, it could be considered legitimate,
whatever the actual outcome. Hart and Sacks put the proposition in its definitive
form in The Legal Process:
The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence [in the
settlement of disputes] is the establishment of regularized and
peaceable methods of decision. The principle of institutional
settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are
the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind
ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless
and until they are duly changed5 3
What qualities make up a "duly arrived at result" of a "duly established"
procedure? First, Legal Process theory focused on the need for "institutional
competence"-that is, that the institution that decides a particular dispute
should be the one best suited to decide it. The relevant question was: "With
respect to this particular matter, is the legislature as an institution a more
appropriate agency of settlement than a court?" 5 4 In particular, legislatures
were better suited than courts to deal with polycentric, broadly based disputes,
while the administrative tribunals which had sprung up during the New Deal
might be better suited for disputes centering on their area of expertise.
51 N. Dorsen, "In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks" (1991) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 11 at 14.
52 D. Kennedy, "Legal Formality" (1973) 2J. Legal Stud. 351 at 395: "It represents a much more
ambitious undertaking than neo-positivism, proposing a radical reconception of the situation
of the judge rather than merely our reconciliation with the ruins of earlier intellectual accom-
plishments."
The Legal Process, supra note 14 at 4 (emphasis added).
Ibid. at 366.
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Second, beyond institutional competence was the principle of "reasoned
elaboration." This principle offered a way out of the indeterminacy of Legal
Realism by arguing that proper reasons for judgments, grounded in "principles
which maintain the integrity and the workability of the legal system as a
whole", would provide a basis for judicial legitimacy.5 5 Legitimate reasons
must amount to more than "mere fiat or precedent", argued Henry Hart in a
harsh criticism of the Warren Court; they must provide:
...the underpinning of principle which is necessary to illumine
large areas of the law and thus to discharge the function which
has to be discharged by the highest judicial tribunal of a nation
dedicated to exemplifying the rule of law not only to itself but to
the whole world.56
Herbert Wechsler further delineated the concept of reasoned elaboration
by coining the phrase "neutral principles". In his conception, judgments
must be based on generally applicable reasons that "transcend any immediate
result that is involved."
5 7
Because the provision of duly arrived at, well-reasoned, rigorously neutral
principles was so central to the legitimacy of the judicial project, the Legal
Process theorists insisted on judgments that were clear, consistent and proper
even as to technical matters, written by properly deliberative judges. In successive
Forewords for the Harvard Law Review, first Ernest Brown
58 and then Hart 59
criticized the Supreme Court for taking too many cases, providing inadequate
reasons and dealing shabbily with technical points. Though scholars such as
Hart were ridiculed for, as Thurman Arnold said, focusing on "very involved
procedural issue[s] which the Professor, for reasons which are not clear to me,
thinks [are] of supreme national importance", 60 technical matters were the
root of judicial legitimacy for the Process theorists. The result, as Gary Peller
puts it, was this:
The late-fifties editions of leading law reviews are filled with an
amazing number of articles on jurisdiction, standing, ripeness,
mootness, choice of law, federal/state comity, and procedural
Duxbury, supra note 2 at 641. See also White, supra note 22.
56 Supra note 13 at 99.
5758 Supra note 12 at 19.
Supra note 11.
60 Supra note 13.
T. Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology" (1960) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 at 1299.
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issues generally. It is as if the table of contents of Hart and
Wechsler's Federal Courts casebook suddenly became the
intellectual agenda for a whole generation of legal scholars.
61
Significant aspects of the Legal Process school follow from the general
principles stated above. For example, because the principle of institutional
competence suggested that a duly arrived at decision of a legislature on an
issue it was competent to decide was legitimate, statutory interpretation
escaped the rigid literalism imposed by conceptualist thinkers of an earlier
day, whose preference was for the fixed principles of the common law. For
Process theorists, statutes must be interpreted "to carry out their purposes
over time, an openly dynamic theory".
62
Interpretation of the common law also allowed for a dynamic approach.
This approach was subject to the limits of institutional competence and reasoned
elaboration, but where a court had both a duty to decide a dispute and the
obligation to give meaningful reasons, the Court could go against unpersuasive
prior judgments: "the very considerations of policy which underly [sic] the
doctrine of stare decisis in its ordinary applications may thus call for exemptions
to it in extraordinary situations." 63 Thus, between purposive statutory
interpretation and a willingness to intervene in some common law cases,
judges could become "deputy legislators.. .bringing the legal doctrines in line
with the more general policies and principles of social life reflected in
legislation."
64
Finally, a significant bedrock assumption of Legal Process must be noted.
The school's faith in law and process as against pure politics-its belief that
proper reasons could and should command the respect and obedience of society-
stemmed in large part from its belief that common consensus existed in
American society. Hart and Sacks saw society as a "common enterprise" of
"human beings striving to satisfy their respective wants under conditions of
interdependance [sic]". 65 As Eskridge and Frickey note, this reflected "a deep
satisfaction and confidence that lawyers felt during the era of economic
growth and consensus politics in America after World War II." 66 It is unfair
to suggest, as Mark Tushnet does, that the Process school thought that "a
society in fundamental agreement on the basics of the social order faced
61 Supra note 18 at 568.
62 Eskridge, supra note 22 at 143.
63 The Legal Process, supra note 14 at 420.
64 Peller, supra note 18 at 596.
65 Ibid. at 4.
66 supra note 15 at 2045.
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merely technical problems of implementing its desires." 67 Disputes might
still run deep; Legal Process simply suggested that decisions on such issues
took their legitimacy from being decided in the right way by the right institution.
These, then, are the basic principles that animate the Legal Process
school: an acknowledgment of the Realist critique of the legitimacy of
conceptualist understandings of law, mixed with a belief that institutional
competence and principled reasoning would legitimize the legal enterprise,
and infused throughout with a faith in law and a belief in the dynamic
potential of both statute and common law. Richard Posner, referring to
Harvard's one-time conservativism in response to the Legal Realism advanced
by schools such as Yale, 68 has criticized the Legal Process school as "Harvard's
answer to legal realism...warmed-over Langdellianism". 69 This criticism gives
short shrift to a project which effected a valuable synthesis-adopting Legal
Realism's insights, while rejecting its worst nihilistic tendencies and restoring
a basis for consistency and legitimacy in the law. As the next section will
show, many of the same virtues that are found in the writings of the Legal
Process school are also apparent in Bora Laskin's writings.
IV. LASKIN AND LEGAL PROCESS
For Laskin, as for the Legal Process and Legal Realism schools, the conceptualist
myth of law as a perfectly autonomous, non-political phenomenon was simply
no longer persuasive. As Laskin put it, "law must pay tribute to life...."7 ° More
stringently, he wrote in criticism of an article suggesting that the social
background of a particular statute was irrelevant:
The... [statement]...poses the question whether any serious student
of constitutional law can long entertain the delusion that
constitutional adjudication is 'pure' law, divorced from social
or economic or political (in the highest sense) views. It is true
that the Privy Council has often said that it is not concerned
with the wisdom or policy of particular legislation, but surely
this has meant nothing more than a token bow to the legislature.
71
67 Supra note 25 at 177.
68 See Kalman, supra note 4.
69 R.A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 75-76.
70 B. Laskin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians" (1951) 29 Can.
Bar Rev. 1038 at 1073 [hereinafter "Supreme Court"].
B. Laskin, "Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's the 'Matter'?" (1955) 11 U.T.L.J. 114 at
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Unlike many Legal Realists, however, Laskin did not respond to the critique
of conceptualism by rejecting the determinacy or legitimacy of law. Beatty
and Langille, in suggesting that Laskin could not fit comfortably under the
Realist rubric, observe:
[Ojur reading of Laskin's early theoretical writings.. .reveals that
they also harbour a deep conviction that the judicial function
must consist of more than the venting of preferences or taking
sides upon debatable and often burning questions. There is an
abiding faith in Laskin's writings that judges are capable of
identifying the relevant.. .social interests and of infusing their
deliberations and judgments with the spirit of social
understanding.
72
This analysis is correct. Laskin forthrightly rejected the personal-preference
model of understanding judicial decision making, thus placing himself outside
the mainstream of Realist thought.73 Rather, he retained a belief in the
possibilities of the law and in the judge's ability to engage in dynamic but
rational interpretation of the law. Thus, he vowed to his new colleagues upon
ascending to the Supreme Court that he "had no constituency to serve save
the realm of reason." 74 For Laskin, notwithstanding the Realist critique of
law as indeterminate, law should be "a strong strand in the cultural evolution
of our country." 75 Respect for the law and the judges who help shape it infuses
Laskin's writing.
Like the Process theorists, Laskin's respect for the bench was tempered
by-and was a cause of-his belief that limits should be set on judicial decision
making. This is the source of the "tension between creativity and constraint"
referred to by Reaume. 76 To Laskin, it was clear that "[tihe judge as automaton
has always been a mythical figure"; 77 but a set of principles and rules could
ultimately set boundaries for the acceptable exercise of judicial creativity. The
limits proposed by Laskin closely resemble the limiting principles adopted by
the Process school.
72
Supra note 7 at 679 (footnotes omitted).
See "Common Law", supra note 46 at 100, where Laskin indicates that he finds uncertainty
an undesirable and untenable legal principle.
B. Laskin, "Institutional Character", supra note 46 at 330.75 B. Laskin, "The Canadian Constitution After the First Century" (1967) 32 Sask. L. Rev. 159 at
160 [hereinafter "Constitution"].76
Supra note 5 at 439.
"Common Law", supra note 46 at 95. See also B. Laskin, "A Judge and His Constituencies"
(1976-77) 7 Man. L.J. 1 at 14: "1 think...that I can safely say that Judges do not regard their
function as requiring them to be indifferent to the quality of the law."
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First, like the Process school, Laskin emphasized the need for reasoned
elaboration. He would not accept judicial decision by "fiat or precedent" any
more than Hart: "Instances in the law are legion in which the settled practice
of years has foreclosed the analytical examination of a principle or the weighing
of its social consequences." 78 With the Process theorists, he believed that
"[t]he judge cannot count on universal acceptance of his reasons for
judgment... 7 9 and therefore insisted that judgments be grounded in careful
deliberation and logical reasoning. Contrary to the political view of the law
that was incipient in the Realist school and flowered with the development
of Critical Legal Studies, Laskin viewed law as a place where rationality could
be applied to pressing social issues:
In these days, when causes of all kinds abound and are pressed
with the same indiscriminate zeal regardless of their relative
weight in the social scale, there is every reason for us to insist
that they be sifted through the cooling and civilizing procedures
which have been time-tested in our courts and in our deliberative
assemblies. This will not, of course, automatically ensure their
attainment; but it will assure those of us whom the advocates
of various causes must persuade, that their causes can stand
rational examination... 80
Laskin demanded the same technical precision and careful reasoning
that is a hallmark of judicial legitimacy under the Process school: "A
discriminating or undiscriminating use of precedent, the depth or shallowness
of legal argument, the relevance or reliability of extrinsic evidence are the
reflections of the mind that is working on the problems of the constitution."
8 1
This "concern about the quality of our law, of its procedures and of those who
make it" 82 was reflected in the same concern addressed by Hart and Brown-
that judges needed adequate "time for reflection" 83 and lacked the time to
write proper decisions. 84 While he did not demand that all judges provide
78 B. Laskin, "The Labour Injunction in Canada: A Caveat" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 270 at 270
[hereinafter "Labour Injunction"]. His language at times echoes Peller's: "A final court which
is prepared to overrule its own precedents puts itself, institutionally, into a partnership, albeit
a junior one, with the legislature." "Institutional Character", supra note 46 at 341.
B. Laskin, "The Judge and Due Process" (1972/73) 5 Man. L.J. 235 at 235.
0 bid. at 237.
8182 "Matter", supra note 71 at 127.
B. Laskin, "The Common Tie Between Judges and Law Teachers" (1972) 6 L. Soc. Gaz. 147 at
148 (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Common Tie"].
"Supreme Court", supra note 70 at 1048.
84 "Institutional Character", supra note 46 at 339.
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reasons for all cases, he emphasized that the provision of reasons constituted:
proof of the Court's recognition of its duty to meet the continuing
expectation of the Bar that they be able to see how an existing
principle of law is applied or distinguished in particular fact
situations or, indeed, how an existing principle is extended or
contracted, or how it is adapted to new situations.
85
Second, Laskin was concerned with the principle of institutional competence.
"[W]here social advance has outstripped legal theory and the gap between
the two must be closed," he noted, "the legislature is better equipped than
the courts to accomplish this result."86 Like the Legal Process school, he identified
polycentric problems as more suited to legislative than judicial resolution:
[Tihe public must be made aware of the limitations of
adjudication.... [Courts] can deal with the nuisance of pollution
as between neighbours but cannot prescribe a clean environment
for the public benefit unless there is some constitutional or
legislative basis for the prescription.
8 7
This sense of needing a tribunal that is appropriately qualified to engage in
legal decision making no doubt animates his approving reference to ER.
Scott's views concerning the Privy Council: "It was therefore obvious to him
that our final Court for constitutional matters must be one that had some
intimacy with Canadian life and would be prepared.. .to allow changing
social and economic forces to be reflected in constitutional interpretation.
" 88
Of course, his competence-based understanding of institutions also led him
to support institutional deference to bodies such as labour tribunals that
appropriately exercise their expertise and authority in a particular area.
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In short, Laskin's writings indicate both a concern with proper reasons as
a limit on judicial discretion and a view of institutional competence as a safeguard
in the rule of law. These jurisprudential views closely track the principles that
lie at the heart of the Legal Process school.
Again, as with the Legal Process school, a host of subsidiary principles
follow from the two major principles discussed above. Most prominent is
85 "A Judge and His Constituencies", supra note 77 at 5.
86 B. Laskin, "The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem of 'Contracting Out'
(1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669 at 671 [hereinafter "Contracting Out"].
87 B. Laskin, "The Function of Law" (1973) 11 Alta. L. Rev. 118 at 120.
88 B. Laskin, "Canadian Federalism: A Scott's Eye View in Prose and Poetry" (1968) 14 McGill L.J.
494 at 496.
89 Beatty and Langille, supra note 7 at 692.
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Laskin's dynamic view of statutory interpretation, which in every way resembles
that adopted by the Process school. Perhaps the most prominent subject of
Laskin's extrajudicial writing in both labour and constitutional law is his
advocacy of a purposive, flexible approach to statutory interpretation.
Laskin's approach seeks to recognize both the intent of the legislature
and the possibility that the purpose of the legislation may change over time.
Complaints about "constitutional rigidity " 9 in constitutional interpretation,
particularly in the face of evolving social needs, recur throughout his writings.
91
Laskin harshly criticized "[the] arid conceptualism in which the state of the
statute book as of 1867 has some mystic significance", 9 2 and called the
"oft-revealed aversion to statute on the part of the common law lawyer" an
"indefensible attitude". 93 His approach is strikingly different from the prevailing
attitude toward statutory interpretation at the time he wrote and wholly
consistent with the Legal Process view of statutory interpretation: "In legislation,
above all else, a court has a manifestation of the 'popular will'; and it is safe
enough to say that interpretation should reflect as much concern with realizing
the object or purpose of the enactment as with its literal expression." 94 As
noted above, the Legal Process school relies considerably on an optimistic
belief in societal consensus. Appropriately, Laskin also exhibits the belief that
the social and political culture about which he is writing shares a set of basic
norms and goals. As Reaume writes, Laskin believed courts could be guided
in part by their understanding of social consensus when they had interstitial
opportunities to be creative. This, of course, "assumes that there is such a
consensus-that there is a common view as to when change is required and
what direction it should take."
95
Finally, mention should be made of a piece of evidence somewhat more
intangible and imprecise, but nonetheless telling, regarding Laskin's philosophy
of law. Consider the nature of his writing on constitutional law. Unlike the
firebrand rhetoric of ER. Scott,96 Laskin's writings aim at the Privy Council
and other courts, not with a hammer, but with a chisel. For example, his criticism
90 B. Laskin, "Correspondence: Still More on the Regulation of Insurance" (1946) 24 Can. Bar
Rev. 843 at 843.
91 See e.g., B. Laskin, "A Note on Canadian Constitutional Interpretation" (1943-44) 5 U.T.LJ.
171.
92 B. Laskin, "Municipal Tax Assessment and Section 96 of the British North America Act: The
Olympia Bowling Alleys Case" (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 993 at 994 [hereinafter "Bowling
Alleys"].
"Picketing", supra note 46 at 11.
"Institutional Character", supra note 46 at 342.95
96 Supra note 5 at 462.
See e.g., F.R. Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev.
485; and FR. Scott, "Abolition of Appeals to the Privy Council: A Symposium" (1947) 25 Can.
Bar Rev. 557 at 566-72.
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of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the "Bowling Alley Case" is a
finely wrought examination of the relation of s. 96 of the Constitution Act,
186797 to the authority of municipally based tribunals. 9 8 More tellingly, his
substantial essay criticizing the Privy Council's interpretation of the
Constitution's "peace, order and good government" clause99 is, with only a
few bursts of emotion, 10 0 a careful examination of the "aspect" doctrine in
constitutional law.
Process-oriented thinking, Neil Duxbury has observed, was "a fairly low-key
attitude, an attitude which tended to bubble to the surface of, rather than to
dominate, the works of those who shared it."10 1 Laskin may have been
unaware of the ties that bound him to the Legal Process school, and the
works examined above certainly do not cite Process scholars (other than
Cardozo, who as a precursor to the Process school has not necessarily been
grouped with them). Nor do they echo every idea advanced by the Legal
Process school; "neutral principles," for instance, do not make an explicit
appearance in Laskin's jurisprudence, though they may be seen as animating
some of his concerns about proper reasons for judgment.
Nevertheless, it must be said in summary that in significant ways, the
ideas, concerns and approach taken by Laskin reflect a jurisprudent's
attempts to wed Realist insights with a faith in law and the legal order. This
suggests that he may be properly identified as an adherent to many of the
same principles that form the heart of the Legal Process school.
V. LASKIN AND LEGAL PROCESS IN CONTEXT
If Laskin is wrongly categorized among the Legal Realists and is more accurately
viewed as reflecting the jurisprudence of Legal Process, questions remain:
Why, given that Laskin's legal education took place at the bright dawn of
Realism, do his writings not reflect the Realist philosophy rather than Legal
Process thinking?
Why, when his countryman Frank Scott could be aroused to such passion
by the errors of the Privy Council, did Laskin develop such a highly technical
and professional attack on the decisions of that and other courts?
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
98 "Bowling Alleys", supra note 92.
99 B. Laskin, "'Peace, order and Good Government' Re-Examined (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 1054
[hereinafter "POGG Re-Examined"].
100 See e.g., ibid. at 1076-77. Criticizing Lord Haldane's rigid approach to constitutional
interpretation-a criticism that is a hallmark of Process-oriented thinking - he writes: "He
has fashioned the Procrustean bed; let the constitution, the British North America Act, lie on
it."
101 Supra note 2 at 604.
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Why did Laskin retain a faith in and a focus on process when the issues
that concerned him-the failure of the courts to adapt to the changing world
of labour law, and the Privy Council's constrictive interpretation of federal
power under the Constitution-could just as easily have driven him to reject
the possibility of process altogether?
What follows are some necessarily speculative suggestions that may help
answer these questions. Ultimately, they will require proper study in the context
of a life of Laskin, one which attempts to achieve a close link between his
influences, his experiences and his philosophy of law. Some possibilities do,
however, suggest themselves.
First, one factor militating in favour of the highly technical, process-oriented
critique of constitutional law that Laskin adopted is that, to put it colloquially,
that is where the action was. Unlike the more sweeping rhetoric that has long
characterized American constitutional law and now characterizes the
Canadian law of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,10 2 the constitutional
law addressed by the Privy Council in the first half of this century was highly
technical; it was precisely here, in the realm of the close reading of statutes,
that the Privy Council was dealing Canadian federalism as Laskin saw it its
most grievous blows. Thus, Laskin may have been drawn to a process-oriented,
technical approach that engaged the Privy Council and other courts on their
own terms and sought to sway them through reason and accessible principles.
Second, though we may not know the source of his faith in law and the
legal process, it is certain that Laskin did have faith in the validity of the
courts. As much as he disagreed with and sometimes heaped scorn on the
Courts' approach to such matters as statutory interpretation, he did not
appear to question their legitimacy. He would therefore be likely to adopt an
approach that accepted as a basic premise the legitimacy of the judicial system,
while seeking to constrain it through principles such as institutional competence
and reasoned elaboration.
Third, though Laskin's education certainly was contemporaneous with
the flourishing of Legal Realism, it should be remembered that he attended
Harvard Law School, the birthplace of Langdellianism, which throughout
this period mounted a rearguard action against Legal Realism. 10 3 Indeed, in
the period during which Laskin attended Harvard for graduate studies, a
course in legislation was being taught 104 which has been identified as an
102 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11.
103 See generally Kalman, supra note 4.
104 By Erwin Griswold, who would later come to the defence of Legal Process scholar Henry Hart
following Thurman Arnold's critical article; see supra note 60. See E.N. Griswold, "The
Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge
Arnold" (1960) 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81.
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early ancestor of the Legal Process course. 1° 5 Moreover, Laskin studied under
and was influenced by Felix Frankfurter, whose own concerns about closely
reasoned professional writing, institutional competence and judicial review
mark him as a charter member of the Legal Process school. 10 6 Clearly Laskin
had ample opportunity to be influenced by the same sources as Hart,
Wechsler and the other Legal Process scholars.
Fourth, when Laskin returned to Canada from Harvard in 1937, there
was as yet virtually nothing that could be said to constitute a Canadian legal
academy. Though Laskin taught at Osgoode Hall, Canadian legal teaching
was not then the "humanity and.. .social science" he thought it should be.
10 7
Law as an academic discipline was of less importance than basic legal teaching.
Accordingly, he would have had little opportunity to engage the law on a
broad philosophical level, and few colleagues with whom to do so.
Circumstances militated in favour of a more technical approach to the law.
Fifth, the same reaction to totalitarianism that prompted the Legal
Process scholars in the United States to proclaim a process-oriented school
grounded on a faith in democracy may also have been at work in Laskin's life.
Irving Abella recounts that when Laskin was first asked to teach law at the
University of Toronto, he was made to swear on a bible before witnesses that
"he had no connection with Communism or any other subversive movement.
°108
While such speculation is necessarily weak, it is not unreasonable to suggest
that such events served to remind Laskin that adherence to any seriously
destabilizing or nakedly positivistic legal philosophy could work to his
disadvantage.
Finally, it may simply be that, in comparing Laskin with Legal Realism
and asking why he was not more hot-blooded in his extrajudicial writing, we
misinterpret the character of Legal Realism. While many of its leading figures
were sharp and passionate in their writings, any number of Realists or quasi-
Realists toiled in relative obscurity and wrote in milder tones. In questioning
the technical approach adopted by Laskin, we may be comparing it with a
105 See Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 15 at 2033-34.
106 Ibid. at 2034; note that Henry Hart was a favourite student of Frankfurter. See also Reaume,
supra note 5 at 453-54 (noting that Laskin more closely resembles Frankfurter than other
sociological jurisprudence scholars on the issue of judicial review).
See R.S. Harris, "Interview with B. Laskin" (University of Toronto Archives Oral History
Program: 2 April 1977) at 2. For more of Laskin s views on the importance of legal education
in the academy, see B. Laskin, "The Interrelationship of a University Law School and the Legal
Profession" (1970) 4 L. Soc. Gaz. 210.
108 1. Abella, "The Making of a Chief Justice: Bora Laskin, The Early Years" in The Cambridge
Lectures 1989 (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais Inc., 1990) at 162 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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model of legal writing that, save for the work of a few idiosyncratic figures
such as Jerome Frank, did not exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bora Laskin, beginning his career as a legal academic in the late 1930s, faced
the same crisis as legal scholars elsewhere. If he believed at all in the rule of
law-which he emphatically did-how could he square this belief with the
insights into the political and indeterminate nature of law that the Legal
Realists had produced? If conceptualism was dead and Legal Realism was not
enough, what then? Process jurisprudence, which was already taking shape
as Laskin came to the academy, attempted to explain judicial decision making,
"not in terms of deductive logic or the intuitions of officials, but in terms of
reason, which is embodied in the fabric of the law itself." 10 9 It offered a step
back from the abyss.
I have argued that Laskin took that step, adopting the principles that animate
the Legal Process school and applying them to his explorations of Canadian
labour and constitutional law. Though the historical connection between
Process jurisprudence and Laskin's legal thought remains uncertain, it is clear
that the Legal Process school provides a better description of Laskin's legal
philosophy than does Legal Realism, the school that up until now has been
used to characterize Laskin. The Legal Process School thus offers us an
opportunity to reach a better understanding of a pivotal figure in the
Canadian constitutional tradition.
109 Duxbury, supra note 2 at 602.
